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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2007 Big Tobacco settlement resulted in the largest 
combined attorney’s fee award in United States history.1  As a result 
of the settlement, private attorneys hired by state attorneys general 
were awarded approximately $15 billion in fees.2  With the 
magnitude of this award in mind, it is no surprise that fee shifting 
has been credited with changing the way parties approach modern 
litigation.3  Indeed, Dan Dobbs was correct when he predicted that 
changes in the scope and the exceptions to the American Rule 
regarding attorney’s fees “are likely to work a substantial impact on 






 1. E.g., Mark Curriden, Up In Smoke: How Greed, Hubris and High-Stakes 
Lobbying Laid Waste to the $246 Billion Tobacco Settlement, ABA JOURNAL E-REPORT, 
March 18, 2007, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/up_in_smoke. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See David W. Robertson, Court-Awarded Attorney’s Fees in Maritime Cases: The 
“American Rule” in Admiralty, 27 J. MAR. L & COM. 507, 512 (1996) (explaining that 
the change in scope and exceptions to the American Rule regarding attorney’s 
fees are likely to substantially impact the way law is practiced); see also Dan B. 
Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 DUKE 
L. J. 435, 437 (1986) (“The practice of awarding attorney fees against adversaries is 
causing important changes in the way litigation is financed in the United States.”). 
 4. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 276–77 (2d ed. 1993). 
2
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In 1870, Congress created the first fee-shifting5 statute that 
awarded attorney fees to the prevailing plaintiff at trial.6  The law 
was passed following the Civil War “to ensure the enforcement of 
the newly enacted civil rights acts.”7  Since that time, awarding 
attorney’s fees to a prevailing litigant has become an increasingly 
common practice at both the state and federal level.8 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, federal statutes that allowed for 
attorney’s fee awards increased dramatically.9  Specifically, the 
number of federal fee-shifting provisions increased from 
approximately 30 in 1975 to approximately 150 in 1983.10  At the 
same time, scholarly work devoted to the issue of attorney’s fees 
increased as authors turned their attention to the fee-shifting 
phenomenon.11  Some took a critical approach to the topic, 
arguing that fee shifting compromised what Justice Stewart had 
dubbed the court system’s “prime goal” of securing the “just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”12  In particular, Michael D. Green’s extensive analysis 
 
 5. The term “fee shifting” is used throughout this note and generally refers 
to the rules that decide which party will pay for the attorney’s fees accrued by both 
parties during the litigation.  See Ronald Breautigam et al., An Economic Analysis of 
Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 173 (1984). 
 6. Kyle R. Kravitz, Note, Denying the Devil His Due: Contingency Fee Multipliers 
After City of Burlington v. Dague, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1661, 1661 (1993) (analyzing the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington v. Dague and arguing for several 
permissible alternatives to contingency enhancement). 
 7. Id. 
 8. 1 ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATTORNEYS’ FEES § 6:7 (3d ed. 2009). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See generally Joan Chipser, Attorney’s Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 
29 HASTINGS L.J. 319 (1977) (providing a historical overview of the federal bad 
faith exception and arguing for its adoption in California); Dobbs, supra note 3 
(discussing the bases for attorney’s fees, who is entitled to them, and how they are 
calculated); John Luebsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee 
Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984) (providing a detailed account of the 
American Rule from the emergence of colonial legislation to the partial 
abandonment of the rule due to emerging exceptions in the second half of the 
twentieth century); John J. Sullivan, The Equal Access to Justice Act in the Federal 
Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1089 (1984) (arguing for an expansive construction of 
the “substantially justified” test within the Equal Access to Justice Act to permit fee 
awards when the government’s actions and arguments were not part of a dispute 
in which there was some likelihood it could have prevailed); Joyce M. Zehr, 
Attorney’s Fees, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 793 (1987) (providing a practical overview of 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ posture towards the application of attorney’s 
fees in addition to examining the policy implications for and against allowing 
waivers as a condition for settlement). 
 12. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 202 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
3
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of the effect of fee shifting on efficiency and fairness pointed to two 
critical problems related to attorney’s fees: (1) an increase in 
piecemeal appeals13 and (2) confusion regarding the appropriate 
time to appeal.14 
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed similar 
concerns regarding attorney’s fees in T.A Schifsky and Sons, Inc. v. 
Bahr Construction, LLC.15  While the court’s decision does not 
illuminate the degree to which fee shifting has burdened courts 
and litigants, it does indicate that problems relating to fee shifting 
in Minnesota persist.  In light of T.A. Schifsky, this note attempts to 
analyze issues of attorney’s fees in Minnesota with a focus on 
procedural efficiency and fairness to litigants.  Given that similar 
analyses have often been confined to a federal perspective, an 
analysis at the state level is particularly important.16 
 
 
(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1); see also Richard S. Crummins, Judgment on the Merits 
Leaving Attorney’s Fees Issues Undecided: A Final Judgment?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 
488 (1987) (“[F]ee issues are often determined many months after liability issues 
have been resolved.  This delay, when considered in light of the requirement that 
a judgment be ‘final’ before it may be appealed, poses serious problems for 
litigants who, understandably, wish to expedite the resolution of their disputes by 
appealing as early as possible.”); Michael D. Green, From Here to Attorney’s Fees: 
Certainty, Efficiency, and Fairness in the Journey to the Appellate Courts, 69 CORNELL L. 
REV. 207, 211 (1984) (“With the increasing frequency and significance of fee 
shifting has come substantial confusion over when, during a given case, the issue 
of attorney’s fees must be decided, the appropriate procedural devices for raising 
and deciding a fee request, and the extent to which resolution of the fee issue is a 
predicate for appellate jurisdiction.”).  Minnesota has adopted this same language 
to guide state proceedings.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The rules] shall be construed 
and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action.”).  
 13. See Green, supra note 12, at 276 (“Severing defendants’ fees from the 
merits produces many of the disadvantages previously discussed in the context of 
plaintiffs seeking fees.  These include enlarging the number of piecemeal appeals . 
. . .”). 
 14. Id. at 211 (“Where an individual has asserted a claim for attorney’s fees, 
this confusion has resulted in the loss of the right to appellate review of the merits 
of the case or appellate review of an award of attorney’s fees.”). 
 15. 773 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn. 2009). 
 16. An analysis of the issues involving attorney’s fees appeals in California has 
been published.  Jineen T. Cuddy, Fee Simple? Indeterminable: Inconsistent Procedures 
Regarding Attorney Fees and Posting Appeal Bonds, 24 PAC. L.J. 141 (1992) (urging the 
California courts or state legislature to resolve the judicial confusion regarding 
whether a judgment for attorney’s fees is automatically stayed pending appeal); see 
also ROSSI, supra note 8 at § 11:1 (“A few jurisdictions have adopted the ‘private 
attorney general’ exception to the American Rule, under which fees may be 
allowed where litigation vindicates a public policy, but attempts to have such a 
broad rule recognized have generally been unsuccessful.”). 
4
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This note begins by outlining the origins of fee reallocation in 
America and in Minnesota.17  Part III provides a chronological 
outline of important Minnesota Supreme Court decisions that 
address the treatment and characterization of attorney’s fees.18  Part 
IV is devoted to a discussion of the recent Minnesota Supreme 
Court decision in T.A. Schifsky.19  Part V of the note addresses 
Green’s criticisms related to the effects of fee shifting within the 
context of Minnesota case law.  Specifically it discusses (1) whether 
Minnesota’s treatment of attorney’s fees burdens courts with 
inefficient, piecemeal appeals, and (2) whether Minnesota’s 
characterization of attorney’s fees nurtures unfairness within the 
appeals process.20 
With respect to the first issue, the note concludes that while 
Minnesota case law allows for attorney’s fees to be appealed 
separately from the merits, this allowance does not burden the 
court system with piecemeal appeals.21  This is because district 
courts generally rule on attorney’s fees in an expedient manner, 
which in turn allows appellate courts to consolidate attorney’s fees 
appeals with appeals on the merits and prevent piecemeal 
litigation.  With respect to the second issue—fairness to litigants—
the note concludes that the holding in T.A. Schifksy fails to provide 
the necessary guidance for litigants to confidently anticipate the 
running of the appeals period.22  In order to prevent confusion and 
untimely appeals, two solutions are proposed that may provide 
some clarity to the inherently complex relationship between 
attorney’s fees and merit-based judgments. 
II. HISTORY OF ATTORNEY’S FEES 
A. The English Rule Regarding Attorney’s Fees 
The prevailing maxim under the English Rule regarding 
attorney’s fees can be summarized in three simple words: the loser 
pays.23  Under the English Rule, “a losing litigant must pay the 
 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See infra Part V. 
 21. See infra Part V. 
 22. See infra Part V. 
 23. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 55 (2005). 
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winner’s costs and attorney’s fees.”24  Enacted in 1275, the Statute 
of Gloucester was the probable origin of the English Rule.25  
Despite its limitations on the disbursement of costs, the statute was 
the first to give plaintiffs a right to fees in “specified real property 
actions.”26  While early English courts allowed the Chancellor to 
award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, the Chancellor rarely 
exercised this power.27 
Over time, and primarily by statute, the rules pertaining to 
attorney’s fees expanded in English courts.28  While traditional fee-
shifting rules often favored the plaintiff, defendants were given 
power to recover attorney’s fees on the same basis around the turn 
of the fifteenth century.29  Enacted in 1875, Order 55 of the Rules 
of Court provided that costs and attorney’s fees attached to court 
proceedings would be under the sole discretion of the English 
courts.30  Despite its elaborate system of taxing costs, the modern 
English system is still heavily influenced by the principle of “the 
loser pays.”31 
B. The Development of the American Rule 
The American Rule provides that all litigants must bear their 
own attorney’s fees absent statutory or contractual authorization.32  
It may be difficult to provide a historical synopsis of the American 
 
 24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 609 (9th ed. 2009). 
 25. Geoffrey Woodroffe, Loser Pays and Conditional Fees – An English Solution?, 
37 WASHBURN L.J. 345, 345 (1998) (discussing the historical development of both 
the English Rule and the American Rule and comparing the merits of each 
approach to the issue of attorney’s fees). 
 26. Id.; see also Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 852 (1929) 
(explaining that the Statute of Gloucester was “[t]he first statute which gave the 
plaintiff his costs, and the one on which the whole law on the subject was based 
until 1875”). 
 27. John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured 
Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570 (1993). 
 28. Id. at 1571.  
 29. Goodhart, supra note 26, at 853. 
 30. Id. at 854. 
 31. The continued adherence to the English Rule has created some 
additional gridlock and delay in English courts.  See Vargo, supra note 27, at 1571 
(“Under this system, the solicitor representing the winning party prepares a bill of 
costs, detailing each item of taxable expense.  If the losing party agrees, it pays the 
bill; parties, however, rarely agree.  When disputed, the parties present their 
itemized expenses to a taxing master who decides the appropriate amounts after a 
hearing.”). 
 32. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (9th ed. 2009); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 55 
(2005). 
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Rule in light of John Leubsdorf’s assertion that “the American Rule 
has no history.”33  However, this difficulty is likely because, “as far 
back as one can trace, courts in [America] have allowed winning 
litigants to recover their litigation costs from losers only to the 
extent prescribed by the legislature.”34  Prior to American 
independence, colonial legislatures commonly passed laws that 
limited the amount that attorneys could charge for their services 
and the amount that “could be recovered from a defeated 
adversary.”35  However, lawyers in the colonies refused to revert to 
the complexities of the English Court system and began emerging 
as “private profit-seekers” during the time of the American 
Revolution.36  Lack of legislative interference with private attorney-
client fee agreements was an important factor in the establishment 
of the American Rule.37 
The American Rule has confronted numerous challenges 
throughout its history.38  However, 179 years after the Supreme 
Court adhered to the Rule in Arcambel v. Wiseman, the Court 
reiterated its loyalty to the Rule in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. 
Wilderness Society.39  Referring to the American Rule, the Alyeska 
Court stated: “It is deeply rooted in our history and in 
congressional policy; and it is not for us to invade the legislature’s 
province by redistributing litigation costs in the manner suggested 




 33. Luebsdorf, supra note 11, at 9. 
 34. Id.; see Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796).  Responding to the 
circuit court’s decision to charge the losing party $1,600 in attorney’s fees, the 
Court stated,  
[w]e do not think this charge ought to be allowed.  The general practice 
in the United States is in opposition to it; and even if that practice were 
not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, 
till it is changed, or modified, by statute.   
Id. 
 35. Luebsdorf, supra note 11, at 10. 
 36. Id. at 13. 
 37. Vargo, supra note 27, at 1575. 
 38. John M. Bjorkman, Minnesota and the American Rule: The Recoverability of 
Attorneys’ Fees Following In Re Silicone Implant Insurance Coverage Litigation, 30 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 541, 542 (2003) (providing a thorough, detailed history of 
the American Rule and its application in Minnesota courts). 
 39. See Arcambel, 3 U.S. at 306; Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 
421 U.S. 240, 271 (1975). 
 40. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 271. 
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Despite the American Rule’s continued relevance in the 
American legal landscape, a number of exceptions have diminished 
its prominence over time.  For example, an award of attorney’s fees 
may be based on a court’s inherent power to sanction.41  This 
practice is often dubbed the “bad faith exception” to the American 
Rule.42  In addition, attorney’s fees may also be recovered when a 
contract under which the plaintiff brings suit includes a fee-shifting 
provision.43  Luebsdorf notes that the contractual exception was the 
most important exception during the late nineteenth century “if 
importance is measured by frequency of use.”44  As courts were 
acknowledging the shifting of fees based on private contracts, both 
federal and state legislatures began eroding the American Rule 
through statutory provisions.45  Over the past century, the 
proliferation of such statutes at both the federal and state level has 
chipped away at the American Rule’s dominance in the United 
States’ judicial landscape.46 
C. A Brief History of Fee Shifting in Minnesota 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the American Rule 
as early as 1874.47  In Kelly v. Rogers, the court held that the plaintiff 
could not recover attorney’s fees incurred as a result of the 
defendant’s fraudulent actions.48  Just three years later, the court 
reaffirmed the importance of the Rule in Frost v. Jordan, holding 
that the defendant could not recover the attorney’s fees he 
incurred as a result of defending an attachment bond action.49  
Interestingly, in both early cases, the court justified the denial of 
attorney’s fees in part by alluding to the unfairness of providing 
 
 41. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 56 (2005).  This list of exceptions to the American 
Rule cited in this section is demonstrative, not exhaustive.  Other exceptions 
include common fund attorney’s fees and the third-party exception.  See Vargo, 
supra note 27, at 1579–81; see also Bergquist v. Kreidler, 158 Minn. 127, 130, 196 
N.W. 964, 965 (1924) (applying the third-party exception to the American Rule). 
 42. See Chipser, supra note 11, at 319. 
 43. Luebsdorf, supra note 11, at 24. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 25. 
 46. Id. at 29–30 (“While the courts were expanding these exceptions to the 
American Rule, legislatures were also coming around to the view that at least some 
litigation was a desirable thing.  Fee provisions were attached to a variety of federal 
statutes, and also to state statutes.”). 
 47. Bjorkman, supra note 38, at 543. 
 48. Kelly v. Rogers, 21 Minn. 146, 152–53 (1874). 
 49. Frost v. Jordan, 37 Minn. 544, 547, 36 N.W. 713, 714 (1887). 
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attorney’s fees for one party over the other.50  Although the 
Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the importance of the 
American Rule, the court limited the Rule from the bench.  For 
example, in 1924, the court recognized the third-party exception.51  
In Bergquist v. Kreidler, the court determined that parties thrust into 
the litigation by a third party’s fraudulent misrepresentation are 
entitled to recover attorney’s fees as a part of the damages in the 
case.52 
In the early nineteenth century, many states began to pass laws 
concerning the allocation of costs and attorney’s fees.53  The first 
set of these statutes was passed during the Granger Era and 
concerned the reallocation of attorney’s fees in the event that a 
railroad was found liable for harming livestock or charging 
unlawful rates.54  Influenced by this legislation, in 1874 the 
Minnesota Legislature adopted its first statute that provided for the 
reallocation of attorney’s fees.55  Section fifteen of the statute 
provided: 
[T]he person, or corporation, or town, village or city so 
offended against, may, for each offense, recover of such 
railroad corporation . . . three times the amount of 
damages sustained by the party aggrieved, together with 
the costs and reasonable attorney’s fee, to be fixed by the 
court when the same is heard on appeal or otherwise, and 




 50. Articulating its rationale for denying the plaintiff’s request for fees, the 
Kelly court stated: “[T]o allow these expenses to the plaintiff, which are never 
allowed to a successful defendant, would give the former an unfair advantage in 
the contest.”  Kelly, 21 Minn. at 152.  The Frost court stated: “[T]o allow attorney’s 
fees would give the defendant in the attachment suit an unfair advantage over the 
plaintiff.”  Frost, 37 Minn. at 546, 36 N.W. at 714. 
 51. Bergquist v. Kreidler, 158 Minn. 127, 130, 196 N.W. 964, 965 (1924). 
 52. Id.  Specifically, the court stated: 
[T]he burden of a mischoice, made in good faith and upon reasonable 
grounds for the action taken, should be placed on the wrongdoer rather 
than his victim.  That result will be accomplished only by holding that the 
latter may recover the reasonable expenses of litigation, undertaken in 
good faith and upon reasonable grounds, to avoid the results of the 
defendants’ wrong. 
Id. 
 53. Vargo, supra note 27, at 1577. 
 54. Luebsdorf, supra note 11, at 25. 
 55. 1874 Minn. Laws 148. 
 56. Id.  The quoted language is taken from Chapter XXVI, Section 15. 
9
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In 1930, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the 
continuing trend of statutory fee shifting as an important exception 
to the American Rule.57  While the court noted that the winning 
party generally does not have the privilege of attorney’s fee 
reimbursement, it did recognize that “[t]here are statutory 
provisions for allowing attorney’s fees to the successful party in 
certain kinds of actions.”58  In many states, provisions for the 
reallocation of attorney’s fees became more prevalent during the 
second half of the twentieth century.59  Minnesota seems to have 
followed this trend.60  Minnesota statutes included 444 fee-shifting 
provisions at the end of the 2008 legislative session.61  Attorney’s fee 
provisions are now common in a variety of Minnesota statutes, such 
as those concerning liens,62 corporate business practice,63 and 
environmental regulations.64 
 
 57. Smith v. Chaffee, 181 Minn. 322, 324–25, 232 N.W. 515, 516 (1930). 
 58. Id. at 324, 232 N.W. at 516. 
 59. ROSSI, supra note 8, § 6:7. 
 60. While an index search is not conclusive as to statutory trends, a 
comparison of the statutory indexes from 1941 and 2008 indicates a vast disparity 
in the amount of provisions in Minnesota statutes that allow for the reallocation of 
attorney’s fees.  Compare 2 REVISOR OF STATUTES, MINNESOTA STATUTES 4426–27 
(1941) (the index of Minnesota statutes lists nineteen provisions for the 
reallocation of attorney’s fees under the topic heading “Attorneys At Law” and 
subheading “Fees and Compensation”), with 13 REVISOR OF STATUTES, MINNESOTA 
STATUTES 953–56 (2008) (the index of Minnesota statutes lists 339 provisions for 
the reallocation of attorney’s fees under the topic heading “Attorney’s Fees”).  
Moreover, because the 2008 index references multiple other sections in which 
relevant provisions can be found, the number of Minnesota statutory provisions 
for the reallocation of attorney’s fees in 2008 exceeds the number listed under the 
heading “Attorney’s Fees.”  13 REVISOR OF STATUTES, MINNESOTA STATUTES 953-56 
(2008); see also infra note 61. 
 61. See Information Brief from Matt Gehring, Legislative Analyst, Research 
Department, to Minnesota House of Representatives (Nov. 2008), available at  
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/attyfee.pdf. 
 62. See MINN. STAT. § 270C.63, subdiv. 15 (2008) (providing for an award of 
attorney’s fees if a lien is found to be erroneous); MINN. STAT. § 514.945, subdiv. 8 
(2008) (providing for an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an 
agricultural producer’s lien); MINN. STAT. § 514.99, subdiv. 5 (2008) (providing for 
an award of attorney’s fees in certain common law lien cases). 
 63. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.461, subdiv. 4(a) (2008) (providing for an award 
of attorney’s fees in the event that a corporation unsuccessfully applies for an 
order banning the disclosure of commercially sensitive information); MINN. STAT. 
§ 302A.467 (2008) (providing discretion for a court to award attorney’s fees when 
a corporate officer violates a statute within Chapter 302A). 
 64. See MINN. STAT. § 115.072 (2008) (providing for an award of “litigation 
expenses incurred by the state” when the state prevails in securing a civil penalty, 
injunctive relief, or an action to compel compliance under Minnesota’s Water 
Pollution Control Act); MINN. STAT. § 115A.86, subdiv. 6(c) (2008) (providing for 
10
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III. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES AND THE 
FINAL JUDGMENT RULE 
A. A Common Conundrum: The Effect of Attorney’s Fees Appeals on the 
Finality of Judgments 
A final judgment is “a court’s last action that settles the rights 
of the parties and disposes of all issues in controversy, except for 
the award of costs (and, sometimes attorney’s fees) and 
enforcement of the judgment.”65  According to the final judgment 
rule, a party can only appeal from a final decision or judgment in 
the absence of a statute or rule that dictates otherwise.66  Where a 
trial court’s decision is not final, the appellate court does not have 
jurisdiction over the appeal and must dismiss it.67  While the final 
judgment rule was first embodied in a federal statute, most states 
have adopted it in a similar form.68  As with many legal principles, 
however, the final judgment rule is more easily stated than 
applied.69  One can no longer assume that the last order in the case 
is the only final appealable order.70 
Two competing policies underlying the final judgment rule 
have nurtured the continued confusion over the rule’s application: 
preventing costly, inefficient piecemeal appeals and minimizing 
delay when appealing a judgment.71  Proponents of the final 
judgment rule argue that the rule furthers an efficient court system 
 
an award of attorney’s fees for a county in the event that a party delivers mixed 
waste to an improper facility). 
 65. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (9th ed. 2009).  Worded differently, a 
judgment is not final if an additional claim has yet to be resolved.  3 ERIC J. 
MAGNUSON & DAVID F. HERR, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: APPELLATE RULES 
ANNOTATED § 103.6(b) (2010). 
 66. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 79 (2007). 
 67. Id.  The final judgment rule is a jurisdictional requirement.  Id.  While 
almost all jurisdictions adhere to it, its application depends on its adoption in the 
form of a statute or rule.  Id. 
 68. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United 
States . . . .”). 
 69. Annotation, Appealability, Under U.S.C.A. § 1291, of Order Awarding or 
Denying Attorneys’ Fees, 73 A.L.R. FED. 271 (1985) (discussing how the problem of 
determining whether an order is tied to the merits of the case is particularly 
troublesome for an order awarding attorney’s fees). 
 70. See id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (9th ed. 2009) (illuminating 
the inconsistent effect that attorney’s fee determinations have on final judgments 
by stating that final judgments dispose of all issues “except for the award of costs 
(and, sometimes, attorney’s fees).”). 
 71. Crummins, supra note 12, at 491. 
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by reducing the number of appeals.72  In addition, the rule has the 
effect of consolidating all claims of error into one appellate 
proceeding.73  Consolidation not only reduces court costs and 
attorney’s fees for litigants, but also ensures that judges are hearing 
appeals in an efficient manner that prevents the clogging of 
dockets.74  On the other hand, a strict application of the final 
judgment rule can cause significant delay in appellate review that 
may further burden the court system.75  In some circumstances, 
such a delay can also cause harm to the party denied immediate 
review.76 
A pending determination of attorney’s fees subsequent to a 
judgment on the merits provides a practical glimpse into the 
tension between these two competing policies.77  In some 
jurisdictions, a pending attorney’s fee determination may prevent 
the original judgment from becoming final and appealable, thus 
preventing the possibility of the attorney’s fee issue being appealed 
separate from the merits.78  In these jurisdictions, the attorney’s 
fees are often considered to be attached to the merits.79  In other 
jurisdictions, the attorney’s fee determination does not prevent an 
initial judgment from becoming final, meaning the initial 
judgment can be appealed without delay.80  These jurisdictions 
often characterize the attorney’s fees as collateral to the merits of 
the case.81  In either case, the relationship between the attorney’s 
fee issue and the initial judgment has significant consequences for 
litigants’ ability to properly appeal in Minnesota because of its 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.   
 74. See id.  
 75. See id.; Green, supra note 12, at 215–16. 
 76. Green, supra note 12, at 215–16 (“More serious hardships resulting from 
the final decision requirement may include losing a unique piece of property 
without any opportunity to recover it after a successful appeal, or suffering 
‘irreparable injury’ when injunctive relief is incorrectly denied.”). 
 77. Crummins, supra note 12, at 488; see also Annotation, supra note 69, at 
271. 
 78. See Local Union No. 1992 of Elec. Workers v. Okonite Co., 358 F.3d 278, 
287 n.13 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting the exception when attorney’s fee issues are not 
collateral to the merits of the litigation because they are an integral part of the 
contractual relief sought). 
 79. Id. 
 80. United States ex rel. Shutt v. Cmty. Home & Health Care Servs., Inc., 550 
F.3d 764, 766 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Int’l Ass’n of Ironworkers Local Union 75 v. 
Madison Indus., Inc., 733 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1984)) (adopting the bright-line 
rule that “all attorney’s fees requests are collateral to the main action”). 
 81. Id. 
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effect on the proper time to appeal.82 
In the past, Minnesota courts generally held that a judgment 
had to be “complete” in order for an appeal to be proper.83  Despite 
these efforts, issues continue to arise regarding the relationship 
between attorney’s fees, final judgments, and proper appellate 
procedure in Minnesota.  The following section provides an 
overview on how Minnesota courts have addressed the complex 
relationship between a final judgment and a subsequent 
determination of attorney’s fees. 
B. Attorney’s Fees Litigation in Minnesota—The “Collateral” vs. 
“Attached to the Merits” Characterization 
1. Spaeth v. City of Plymouth 
In 1984, the Minnesota Supreme Court first addressed the 
relationship between a subsequent determination of attorney’s fees 
and a final, appealable judgment in Spaeth v. City of Plymouth.84  In 
Spaeth, the plaintiff sought attorney’s fees and petitioned the court 
to compel the city of Plymouth to initiate eminent domain 
proceedings on his flooded property.85  The trial court granted the 
 
 82. On December 7, 1967, the Minnesota Legislature adopted Minnesota 
Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure 104.01 and 103.03, which codified prior 
statutes setting forth the necessary criteria for a proper appeal.  MINN. R. CIV. APP. 
P. 103.03; MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01.  The former civil appellate procedural rules 
regarding time for filing and service of a civil appeal were codified by statute and 
were subsequently repealed after the adoption of additional appellate procedural 
rules in 1967.  MINN. STAT. § 605.08 (repealed 1974).  Rule 104.01 was later 
simplified by an amendment in 1998 that established a shorter, sixty-day period to 
appeal from both final judgments and appealable orders.  MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 
104.01.  In addition, Rule 103.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate 
Procedure was amended in 1998 to make clear that only final judgments or partial 
judgments under Rule 54.02 are appealable.  MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.03(a); see 
MAGNUSON & HERR, supra note 65.  Therefore, according to the current Minnesota 
rules, an individual filing a notice of appeal must do so within sixty days of the 
judgment or order, but must also ensure that the judgment is final in nature.  
MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.03(a); MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01.  Once a judgment is 
deemed final, the limited time for appeal begins to run.  See MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 
104.01. 
 83. See In re Estate of Colby, 223 Minn. 157, 157, 25 N.W.2d 769, 769 (1947) 
(holding that where costs had not been taxed and had not been waived, the 
judgment is considered incomplete and any appeal should be dismissed as 
premature); see also MAGNUSON & HERR, supra note 65, at § 103.6 (noting that in 
older Minnesota cases, the judgment had to be “complete” in order for an appeal 
to be available). 
 84. 344 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 1984). 
 85. Id. at 817. 
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plaintiff’s writ of mandamus and ordered the city to commence 
eminent domain proceedings.86  In addition, the court held that 
the plaintiff was entitled to attorney’s fees and expert fees pursuant 
to Minnesota Statutes section 117.045.87  Before the trial court 
decided on the amount of fees, the city appealed.88  The trial court 
then awarded the plaintiff fees in the amount of $66,158.12.89  The 
city appealed again, challenging both the trial court’s continuing 
jurisdiction to decide the amount of attorney’s fees and the 
amount of attorney’s fees the court awarded.90  The supreme court 
subsequently consolidated both appeals into a single proceeding.91 
On appeal, the city argued that the filing of its first notice of 
appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to decide on issues 
relating to the attorney’s fees.92  At the time of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s review of Spaeth, Minnesota Rule of Civil 
Appellate Procedure 108.03 provided that perfection of an appeal 
“shall stay all further proceedings in the trial court upon the 
judgment or order appealed from or the matter embraced therein; 
but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter included in 
the action, and not affected by the judgment or order appealed 
from.”93  Therefore, the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court to 
determine issues relating to attorney’s fees depended on whether 
the attorney’s fees were considered collateral to the merits or 
attached to the merits of the underlying litigation.94 
Ultimately, the court concluded that attorney’s fees pursuant 
to section 117.045 were inherently “a matter independent of the 
merits of the litigation.”95  In its reasoning, the court noted that a 
decision to provide trial courts with continuing jurisdiction over 
attorney’s fee determinations would not undercut the policy 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 824. 
 93. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 108.03. 
 94. Spaeth, 344 N.W.2d at 824.  The consolidation of the two appeals was likely 
an attempt by the court to show that the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction over 
attorney’s fees would not undercut the policy against piecemeal appeals.  Through 
consolidation, the court was able to hear all issues regarding the attorney’s fees 
and eminent domain actions in one proceeding. See id. at 817. 
 95. Id. at 825. 
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against piecemeal appeals.96  Summarizing a case in which the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided to provide the district 
court with continuing jurisdiction over an attorney’s fee 
determination, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:  
It also concluded that to do so would not undercut the 
policy against piecemeal appeals.  Rather, it believed such 
a rule would be less likely to cause delay and waste effort 
because the attorneys’ fees motion may be decided before 
the pending appeal has been argued and thus an appeal 
from the ruling on attorneys’ fees could be consolidated 
with the pending appeal.97 
Moreover, because the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees was 
collateral to the merits of the case, the fee award after the 
judgment on the merits was proper and did not affect the finality of 
the original judgment.98 
2. Welsh v. City of Orono 
Just six months after its decision in Spaeth, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court broadened the “collateral” nature of attorney’s fees 
in Welsh v. City of Orono.99  Welsh involved an action for declaratory 
and injunctive relief brought by a landowner after the city denied 
his application for a conditional use permit to conduct lakebed 
dredging.100  Welsh moved for summary judgment on the grounds 
that the city did not have jurisdiction to regulate his activities.101  
The trial court granted summary judgment and ordered the city to 
cease its interference with Welsh’s dredging activities.102  Welsh 
then moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.103  
When the trial court denied the motion, Welsh appealed.104 
As a means of removing the attorney’s fees issue from the 
appeal, the city of Orono echoed the defendant’s argument in 
Spaeth105 and asserted that the trial court was “without jurisdiction to 
 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. (citing Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29, 34 (7th Cir. 1980)). 
 98. Id. at 825–26. 
 99. 355 N.W.2d 117, 124 (Minn. 1984). 
 100. Id. at 119. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 123; see Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn. 
1984). 
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make any order or render any decision affecting the order 
appealed from.”106  Citing Spaeth, the court explained that it had 
adopted the collateral proceeding approach in interpreting an 
inverse condemnation attorney’s fee provision and that it saw “no 
reason why [it] should not apply the same approach in resolving 
timeliness of post-judgment motions for attorney fees under 42 
U.S.C. § 1988.”107  Therefore, the court determined that the 
attorney’s fee issue in Welsh would be characterized as independent 
of the merits of the litigation.108 
3. American Family Insurance Company v. Peterson 
Two years after embracing the “collateral” nature of attorney’s 
fees in Spaeth and Welsh, the Minnesota Supreme Court came to the 
opposite conclusion in American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Peterson.109  In Peterson, the trial court entered the original judgment 
and reserved the issue of attorney’s fees for later consideration.110  
Ultimately, the defendant-insured was awarded attorney’s fees 
based on his claim that American Family Insurance refused to 
defend him in bad faith.111  Reversing the court of appeals, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that absent an express 
determination that the original judgment was final and appealable, 
“the 90-day appeal period [did] not begin to run until the entry of 
the amended judgment adjudicating all issues, including the issue 
of attorney fees.”112  As such, the court impliedly concluded that the 
issues involving attorney’s fees in Peterson were not collateral to the 
 
 106. Welsh, 355 N.W.2d at 123.  This language summarizes the prior Minnesota 
Supreme Court decision in State v. Bentley, 216 Minn. 146, 161, 12 N.W.2d 347, 
356 (1943). 
 107. Welsh, 355 N.W.2d at 124.  However, the court refused to reverse the trial 
court’s denial of Welsh’s motion for attorney’s fees.  Id.  The court concluded that 
“a private action questioning a municipality’s regulatory jurisdiction under state 
law” was not within the “spirit” of section 1988 governing fee awards.  Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. 380 N.W.2d 495, 495 (Minn. 1986). 
 110. Id. at 497. 
 111. T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d 783, 789 (Minn. 2009) (citing Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 393 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 380 N.W.2d 
495, 495 (Minn. 1986)). 
 112. Peterson, 380 N.W.2d at 497.  However, the court did note that the time for 
appeal would begin to run if the court had properly certified a partial final 
judgment under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 54.02.  Id. at 496–
97.  While an award of attorney’s fees may have implications for a certification 
under Rule 54.02, that discussion is beyond the scope of this case note. 
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merits of the case; rather, they were attached to the merits.113 
Interestingly, the Peterson court noted that the characterization 
of attorney’s fees as attached to the merits “advances [the] general 
policy against piecemeal litigation” that is reflected in the 
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and the analysis in Spaeth.114  
While the Spaeth court agreed that piecemeal appeals should be 
avoided, it ultimately concluded that the collateral characterization 
of attorney’s fees was the best way to achieve this goal.115  In 
referring to Spaeth’s emphasis on the prevention of piecemeal 
appeals, however, the Peterson court failed to explain how it could 
support the same policy through the adoption of an opposite 
holding. 
4. Post-Peterson Litigation 
Since Peterson, the Minnesota Supreme Court has realigned 
itself with the Spaeth ruling that attorney’s fee issues are collateral 
to the merits of the case.  In Kellar v. Von Holtum, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that motions for attorney’s fee sanctions, 
costs, and disbursements are independent of the merits of litigation 
such that fees can be awarded after an appeal has been decided.116  
In support of its holding, the court added that “there is likely to be 
little, if any, harm caused by waiting to resolve such collateral issues 
until the merits are resolved.”117 
However, a 2008 Minnesota Court of Appeals decision is 
evidence that the Peterson decision has blurred any bright-line rule 
regarding the relationship between attorney’s fees issues and an 
 
 113. See T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 789–90. 
 114. Peterson, 380 N.W.2d at 497.  With the understanding that its holding may 
weaken judicial efficiency by producing piecemeal litigation, the Spaeth court 
urged appellate courts to take specific actions.  Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344 
N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 1984).  Referring to subsequent determinations of 
attorney’s fees, the Spaeth court “strenuously urge[d] the district courts either to 
rule on such claims as soon as possible after entry of judgment on the merits, or to 
not enter judgment on the merits until the fees issue has been finally resolved.”  
Id. 
 115. Spaeth, 344 N.W.2d at 825. 
 116. Kellar v. Von Holtum, 605 N.W.2d 696, 700 (Minn. 2000). 
 117. Id.  However, the court seems to ignore the fact that the production of 
piecemeal appeals through the separation of the attorney’s fee issues from the 
merits can be harmful by burdening court dockets.  See Green, supra note 12, at 
276 (noting that the creation of piecemeal appeals is one of the many 
“disadvantages” of severing attorney’s fees from the merits). 
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underlying judgment on the merits.118  In City of Waite Park, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed the defendant’s argument 
that the failure to raise the issue of damages in an initial appeal 
precludes a later assertion of damages.119  In doing so, the court 
summarized Peterson by explaining that when district courts reserve 
the monetary award of attorney’s fees for later determination, the 
appeal period does not begin to run until entry of an amended 
judgment adjudicating all issues.120 
IV. THE T.A. SCHIFSKY DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
In T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Construction, LLC, 
Consolidated Lumber Company held four mechanic’s liens against 
Bahr Construction.121  When Consolidated Lumber sought to 
foreclose on the mechanic’s liens, Premier Bank challenged the 
validity of the liens by asserting that they failed to describe and 
identify the liened property with reasonable certainty as required 
by Minnesota law.122  On November 26, 2007, the district court 
found that the liens were valid despite their erroneous listing and 
produced an order stipulating that Consolidated Lumber was 
entitled to the value of the liens in addition to reasonable 
attorney’s fees submitted to the court for later approval.123  The 
district court concluded the order with the following words: 
“[t]here being no just cause for delay, let judgment be entered 
accordingly.”124  Judgment was entered on December 13, 2007.125 
Premier Bank’s motion to amend the district court’s findings 
of fact and motion for a new trial were denied on February 1, 2008, 
and Consolidated Lumber served Premier Bank with a notice of 
 
 118. City of Waite Park v. Minn. Office of Admin. Hearings, 758 N.W.2d 347 
(Minn. 2008). 
 119. Id. at 354–55. 
 120. Id. at 354. 
 121. 773 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn. 2009). 
 122. Id.  Premier Bank asserted this claim based on subdivision 2(5) of section 
514.08 of the Minnesota Statutes.  Id.  The mechanic’s lien in question identified 
the liened property as being located in Section thirty-three, Township thirty, 
Range twenty-two, while the actual location of the property was Section thirty-four, 
Township thirty, Range twenty-two.  Id. 
 123. Id. at 786. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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filing of the order denying the motions on February 6, 2008.126  On 
May 22, 2008, the district court awarded Consolidated Lumber 
$11,543.74 in attorney’s fees, and judgment of the fee order was 
entered on July 24, 2008.127 
On July 30, 2008, just six days after the fee order was entered, 
Premier Bank filed a notice of appeal, citing both the December 
13, 2008 lien judgment and the May 22, 2008 attorney’s fee order.128  
In its notice, Premier Bank described the May 22, 2008, attorney’s 
fee order as “a final adjudication of all the remaining issues set 
forth in the partial judgment . . . entered on December 13, 2007.”129  
On August 27, 2008, the court of appeals dismissed Premier Bank’s 
appeal as untimely by concluding that the December 13, 2007 lien 
judgment was immediately appealable because it contained express 
determinations under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 
104.01 and Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02.130  Rule 54.02 
states, in relevant part: 
When multiple claims for relief or multiple parties are 
involved in an action, the court may direct entry of a final 
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 
claims or parties only upon an express determination that there 
is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the 
entry of judgment.131 
Rule 104.01 states, in relevant part: 
An appeal may be taken from a judgment entered 
pursuant to Rule 54.02, Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure, within 60 days of the entry of the judgment 
only if the trial court makes an express determination that there is 
no just reason for delay and expressly directs the entry of a final 
judgment.  The time to appeal from any other judgment 
entered pursuant to Rule 54.02 shall not begin to run 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  It is important to note that the attorney’s fees judgment was entered 
over seven months after the district court’s original judgment on December 13, 
2007, regarding the liens.  See id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (alteration in original). 
 130. Id.  In dismissing Premier Bank’s notice of appeal, the court of appeals 
states that the December 13, 2007, district court order “contains the express 
determinations under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01 and Minn. R. Civ. P 54.02 to 
allow an immediate appeal.”  Id.  The T.A. Schifsky opinion implies that the express 
determinations referenced by the court of appeals refer to the concluding 
language in the December 13, 2007, district court order: “[t]here being no just 
cause for delay, let judgment be entered accordingly.”  Id. 
 131. MINN. R. CIV. P. 54.02 (emphasis added). 
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until entry of a judgment which adjudicates all the claims 
and rights and liabilities of the remaining parties.132 
According to the court, because the district court made 
express determinations that the December 13, 2007 order was 
immediately appealable, Premier Bank was required to file a notice 
of appeal within sixty days of Consolidated Lumber’s notice of 
filing the February order denying Premier Bank’s post-trial motions 
in order to have maintained a timely appeal.133 
B. The Court’s Holding 
Appealing the dismissal, Premier Bank attempted to persuade 
the Minnesota Supreme Court that its July 30, 2008 appeal was not 
untimely because the November 26, 2007 order regarding the liens 
was not properly certified as a final partial judgment under 
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02.134  The court noted that 
the language “there being no just cause for delay, let judgment be 
entered accordingly” does not necessarily make a judgment a final 
partial judgment under Rule 54.02.135  Fundamentally, application 
of the rule necessitates “multiple claims for relief or multiple 
parties.”136  Interpreting the language of the rule and the legal 
meaning of a claim, the court held that the November 26 district 
court order was not a final partial judgment under Minnesota Rule 
of Civil Procedure 52.02, “[b]ecause the amount of attorney fees 
awarded in a mechanic’s lien action is not a separate claim.”137  In 
other words, the court held that Rule 54.02 did not apply because 
the proceedings did not involve multiple claims.138 
 
 132. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01, subdiv. 1 (emphasis added). 
 133. Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 104.01 states that “an appeal 
may be taken from a judgment within 60 days after its entry, and from an 
appealable order within 60 days after service by any party of written notice of its 
filing.”  MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01, subdiv. 1.  According to the court of appeals, 
Premier Bank must have appealed by April 9, 2008, in order for the appeal to have 
been timely.  T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 786. 
 134. MINN. R. CIV. P. 54.02; T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 786.  Specifically, 
Premier Bank argued that the November 26, 2007, order was not properly 
certified as a final partial judgment under Rule 54.02 because the lien judgment, 
by itself, did not fully adjudicate an entire claim.  T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 786. 
 135. T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 787. 
 136. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 54.02. 
 137. T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 788.  According to the court, an amount of 
attorney’s fees is not another “legal theory of the lawsuit” that would meet Rule 
54.02’s requirement of multiple claims.  Id. 
 138. Id. 
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Next, in order to determine if the court of appeals properly 
dismissed the appeal regarding the validity of the liens, the court 
addressed the question of whether the December 13, 2007 lien 
judgment was immediately appealable as a final judgment.139  The 
court cited two rules it deemed relevant to the question at hand.140  
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 58.01 states that “[e]ntry of 
judgment shall not be delayed for the taxation of costs, and the 
omission of costs shall not affect the finality of the judgment.”141  In 
addition, Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 104.02 states 
that the “[t]ime to appeal from the judgment pursuant to this 
section shall not be extended by the subsequent insertion therein 
of costs and disbursements.”142  Relying on its decision in Obraske v. 
Woody,143 the court concluded that attorney’s fees in mechanic’s lien 
cases are considered costs within the meaning of Rules 58.01 and 
104.02.144  As costs, attorney’s fees are collateral to the merits of the 
underlying litigation regarding the validity of the liens.145  
Therefore, the attorney’s fee determination was not an issue that 
would prevent the December 13, 2007 judgment from becoming 
final.146  Applying these findings to the facts of the case, the court 
concluded that the appeal period began to run upon entry of the 
December 17 judgment such that Premier Bank’s appeal regarding 
the validity of the liens was untimely.147 
In the opinion, Justice Meyer added that characterizing the 
attorney’s fee determination as collateral to the merits did not 
contradict the court’s prior holding in American Family Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Peterson.148  Justifying her assertion, she explained 
that the attorney’s fee issue in Peterson prevented the running of the 
appeal period because the fees were “part of the damages owed by 
the breaching insurer.”149  However, she added, the case at hand 
 
 139. Id. at 788. 
 140. Id. at 788–89 (citing MINN. R. CIV. P. 58.01; MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.02). 
 141. MINN. R. CIV. P. 58.01. 
 142. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.02. 
 143. 199 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn. 1972). 
 144. T.A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 789. 
 145. Id.  Justifying its holding that the attorney’s fees are collateral to the 
merits of the case, the court cited its previous decisions from 1985–2000 in which 
it characterized attorney’s fees issues as collateral.  Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (citing Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 393 N.W.2d 212, 217 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 380 N.W.2d 495, 495 (Minn. 1986)). 
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was distinguishable because the attorney’s fees pursuant to statute 
and case law in mechanic’s lien cases are considered costs as 
opposed to damages attached to the merits of the case.150  Through 
this analysis, the court illuminated an important dichotomy that 
drives determination of the effect of attorney’s fees on the finality 
of judgments: fees constituting damages owed are generally 
connected to the merits of the litigation and must be decided in 
order for a judgment to be final; however, fees that are merely costs 
are generally collateral to the merits and do not affect the finality 
of the original judgment.151 
On two occasions in T.A. Schifsky, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court expressly urged Minnesota courts to approach attorney’s fee 
appeals in a manner that prevents piecemeal appeals.152  After 
interpreting the application of Rule 54.02, the court provided the 
following guidance: 
We have recognized that this reading of the rules may, in 
some circumstances, result in piecemeal appeals, but we 
have also noted that piecemeal appeals are easily avoided 
if the district court declines to direct the entry of 
judgment on the merits until it has resolved the attorney 
fees award . . . .153 
Applying its advice to T.A. Schifsky, the court recognized the 
strategy “was not done in this case.”154 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Ensuring Efficiency: Does Minnesota’s Approach to Attorney’s Fees 
Produce Unnecessary Inefficiencies by Encouraging Piecemeal Appeals?  
1. The Problem of a Second Major Litigation 
In T.A. Schifsky, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained that 
when attorney’s fees are costs as opposed to damages, the fees are 
to be considered collateral and independent of the merits of the 
underlying litigation.155  When attorney’s fees are collateral, 
potential errors surrounding their administration can be appealed 
 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id.  
 152. Id. at 788 n.4, 789. 
 153. Id. at 788, n.4. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See id. at 789. 
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separately from the merits.  Hence, the collateral characterization 
of attorney’s fees inevitably gives rise to an important concern 
regarding judicial efficiency: attorney’s fees issues that are 
collateral to the merits have the potential of burdening the courts 
through the creation of piecemeal appeals. 
Federal courts have often characterized attorney’s fees as 
collateral to the merits of the litigation.156  As a consequence, the 
separation of appeals regarding attorney’s fees and appeals on the 
merits is relatively common.157  In Hensley v. Eckerhart, the U.S. 
Supreme Court noted its concern regarding piecemeal appeals in 
federal courts when it stated that “a request for attorney’s fees 
should not result in a second major litigation.”158  Other federal 
courts have echoed the Supreme Court’s sentiment.159  Moreover, 
scholarly debate has also drawn connections between the federal 
approach to attorney’s fees and potential inefficiencies due to 
 
 156. See, e.g., Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988) 
(discussing the “recoverability or amount of attorney’s fees for the litigation” and 
concluding that they do not bear on the finality of the underlying case); White v. 
New Hampshire Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1982) (explaining that 
a “court’s decision of entitlement to fees [under § 1988] will . . . require an 
inquiry separate from the decision on the merits.”); Echols v. Parker, 909 F.2d 
795, 798 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[A]ttorney’s fees are considered collateral to the merits, 
so that final judgments as to attorney’s fees can be appealed separately from the 
‘merits’ judgment.”); Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 849 F.2d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 
1988) (“[A]wards of attorney’s fees may be appealed separately as final orders 
after a final determination of liability on the merits.”). 
 157. See, e.g., Torres v. Walker, 356 F.3d 238, 241 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(explaining that the court had jurisdiction over an inmate’s immediate appeal of 
district judge’s order of attorney’s fees in excessive force § 1983 suit); People Who 
Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 272 F.3d 936, 937 (7th Cir. 
2001) (holding that attorney’s fees appeal was properly before the court based on 
the collateral order exception, because the refusal of an immediate appeal might 
inflict an irreparable harm on the defendant); Riverhead Sav. Bank v. Nat’l Mortg. 
Equity Corp., 893 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1990) (justifying its jurisdiction to hear 
attorney’s fees sanction appeal by explaining that a “sanctions order imposed 
solely on a non-party to pay attorney’s fees and costs falls within the collateral order 
exception to the finality rule and is appealable immediately as a final order.”) 
(emphasis in original); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 
1985) (justifying its jurisdiction to hear an appeal on attorney’s fees because the 
“district court’s denial of costs and attorneys’ fees fits within the collateral order 
exception to the finality rule.”); Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160, 164 n.7 (2d Cir. 
1980) (justifying jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order regarding attorney’s 
fees based on the collateral order doctrine). 
 158. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). 
 159. Friends of Boundary Water Wilderness v. Thomas, 53 F.3d 881, 883 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 838 F.2d 260, 264 (8th Cir. 1988)) (“The 
case now before us flies in the face of the Supreme Court’s admonishment that the 
‘attorneys’ fee issue should not result in a second major litigation.’”). 
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increased appellate litigation.160 
Because Minnesota courts have often characterized attorney’s 
fees as collateral to the merits of the litigation,161 one would expect 
to find that attorney’s fees appeals and appeals on the merits are 
often separated into different proceedings.  However, the same 
concerns regarding efficiency and piecemeal appeals at the federal 
level have not come to fruition in Minnesota.  As a general 
proposition, attorney’s fees issues in Minnesota have not extensively 
burdened courts with separate appeals, because Minnesota courts 
have long recognized162 the advice embodied by T.A. Schifsky and 
“rule[d] on [attorney’s fee] claims as soon as possible after the 
entry of judgment on the merits.”163 
2. An Important Factor in Preventing Piecemeal Attorney’s Fees 
Appeals: Embracing the Advice of the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
T.A. Schifsky by Consolidating Appeals 
In T.A. Shifsky, the Minnesota Supreme Court implicitly 
recognized that additional attorney’s fees appeals could 
significantly burden the courts.164  In an attempt to prevent such a 
problem, the court restated the advice it originally provided in 
1984, which was that district court judges should either “rule on 
such claims as soon as possible after the entry of judgment on the 
merits or . . . not enter judgment on the merits until the fees issue 
has been resolved.”165  However, the court did not indicate whether 
the revitalization of the advice was a response to the unfortunate 
circumstances in T.A. Schifsky or a reflection of the district courts’ 
general unwillingness to apply the advice. 
When reviewing Minnesota appellate opinions related to 
attorney’s fees, one is hard-pressed to find cases in which attorney’s 
fees were appealed separately from the underlying merits.  While a 
 
 160. See Crummins, supra note 12, at 488 (“The federal courts of appeals 
disagree whether a decision on the merits of a case represents a ‘final’ judgment, 
and thus is appealable, when the district court has awarded, but not quantified, 
attorney’s fees.”); see also Green, supra note 12, at 232 (discussing how 
considerations of court efficiency are tied to the “chameleon-like quality” of 
attorney’s fees at the federal level). 
 161. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 162. See, e.g., Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 1984). 
 163.  T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Const., LLC, 773 N.W.2d 783, 788 n.4 
(Minn. 2009) (quoting Spaeth, 344 N.W.2d at 825). 
 164. See id. 
 165. Id. 
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number of factors may influence this trend, an important factor is 
the consolidation of appeals at the appellate level.166  Despite the 
fact that attorney’s fees can be appealed separately from the merits 
when they are characterized as collateral, Minnesota Court of 
Appeals judges generally consolidate attorney’s fees appeals with 
other merit-based appeals.167  In fact, a detailed review of fees 
appeals in Minnesota indicates that the practice of consolidation 
has been commonplace over the past two decades.168  The frequent 
practice of consolidating appeals indicates that judges are heeding 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s advice and ruling on attorney’s fee 
issues “as soon as possible after entry of judgment on the merits.”169 
An example of this consolidation practice may illuminate its 
practical value in combating piecemeal fee appeals.  In State 
Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board v. Minnesota Democratic-
Farm Labor Party, the district court granted the Democratic-Farm 
Labor (DFL) Party’s  motion for summary judgment after the 
Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board (Board) initiated a 
declaratory judgment action.170  The DFL moved for attorney’s fees 
and costs under the Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act and was 
awarded $24,456 in fees.171  While the motion for attorney’s fees was 
pending, the Board appealed both the summary judgment decision 
and the attorney’s fee amount.172  On appeal, the summary 
judgment and attorney’s fees issues were consolidated in order to 




 166. See MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.02, subdiv. 3 (“Related appeals from a single 
trial court action or appeals in separate actions may be consolidated by order of 
the appellate court on its own motion or upon motion of a party.”). 
 167. In some situations, consolidating appeals may be impractical due to 
timing.  See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 168. See, e.g., In re Custody of N.A.K., 649 N.W.2d 166, 173 (Minn. 2002); 
Haarstad v. Graff, 517 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Minn. 1994); Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 
N.W.2d 117, 119 n.3 (Minn. 1984); Brown v. Cannon Falls Twp., 723 N.W.2d 31, 
39 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); Cent. Baptist Theological Seminary v. City of New 
Brighton, 487 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Bergmann v. Lee Data 
Corp., 467 N.W.2d 636, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); In re Minn. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n, 365 N.W.2d 341, 343 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 169.  T. A. Schifsky, 773 N.W.2d at 788 n.4. 
 170. State Campaign Fin. & Pub. Disclosure Bd. v. Minn. Democratic-Farm 
Labor Party, 671 N.W.2d 894, 896–97 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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Minnesota courts’ practice of consolidation illuminates an 
important tactic in combating potential piecemeal appeals when 
attorney’s fees issues are at stake.  As previously noted, when courts 
characterize the attorney’s fee issues as collateral, they theoretically 
open the door to separately appealing the merits and fees.  
However, consolidation ensures that both appeals are heard in the 
same proceeding and therefore minimizes potential piecemeal 
appeals that may result from the collateral characterization of 
attorney’s fees. 
B. Fairness: Does T.A. Schifsky Provide the Clarity That is Necessary to 
Prevent Untimely Appeals Due to the Characterization of Attorney’s Fees? 
1. Introduction 
In order for a litigant to be afforded the opportunity to appeal 
a judgment, the litigant must have some knowledge as to whether 
or not the judgment is considered final and appealable.174  
Unfortunately, jurisdictions tend to differ as to what constitutes a 
final judgment.175  One can no longer assume that the last order in 
the case is the only final appealable order.176  The finality of a 
judgment is particularly important in determining the limited 
window of time in which a particular appeal can be filed.177 
While this note has shown that attorney’s fees are often 
considered collateral to the merits in Minnesota, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s decision in Peterson178 and dicta in T.A. Schifsky 
indicate that fees can also be attached to the merits.179  This raises 
an important issue.  Knowledge as to whether the attorney’s fees 
issues are characterized as collateral to the merits or attached to 
the merits is a critical factor in appealing within a timely manner.  
Therefore, how does a litigant in Minnesota know how the attorney 
fee’s issue will be characterized in his or her case? 
 
 174. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 79 (2007) (indicating that appeals are 
generally permitted only from final decisions or judgments). 
 175. MARY KAY KANE, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL § 7.1 (6th ed. 2007) 
(“The question of what constitutes finality is one that has posed significant 
difficulties for the courts.”). 
 176. Annotation, supra note 69, at 271. 
 177. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 104.01 (an appeal must be made within sixty days 
after the final judgment is entered). 
 178. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 380 N.W.2d 495, 496 (Minn. 1986). 
 179. T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Const., LLC, 773 N.W.2d 788, 789 
(Minn. 2009). 
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2. T.A. Schifsky: Adopting the Case-By-Case Approach to the 
Characterization of Attorney’s Fees 
In T.A. Schifsky, the Minnesota Supreme Court attempts to 
provide litigants with the guidance necessary to predict how 
attorney’s fees will be characterized.  The court’s discussion of fees 
serves as an implicit recognition that litigants have lacked the 
necessary guidance to determine whether a judgment is final when 
a question of attorney’s fees remained.  While the court emphasizes 
the important difference between fees as costs and fees as damages, 
it concedes that “our decision in [American Family Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Peterson] did not specifically describe the nature of attorney 
fees at issue.”180  In an effort to resolve ambiguity, the court 
implicitly reasons that the categorization of attorney fees as 
damages or costs will resolve the question of whether or not the fee 
determination prevents a judgment from becoming final and 
appealable.181 
In this sense, the court in T.A. Schifsky adopts what Richard S. 
Crummins has dubbed the case-by-case approach to the 
characterization of attorney’s fees.182  According to Crummins, a 
court applying the case-by-case analysis ultimately looks to the 
purpose for which the attorney’s fees are being awarded as a means 
of determining their relationship to the merits.183  When fees are a 
measure of substantive relief and are part of the initial measure of 
liability, they are compensatory in nature and are therefore 
intertwined with the underlying merits of the case.184  On the other 
hand, when fees are merely to reduce litigation costs, they are 
generally collateral to the underlying judgment.185 
Unfortunately, the court in T.A. Schifsky oversimplifies the ease 
with which litigants can confidently categorize the nature of the 
attorney fees.  The arguments made by the parties in T.A. Schifsky 
highlight the complexity of such a categorization.186  The 
 
 180. Id.  Justice Meyer goes on to explain that even though the attorney’s fees 
in American Family Mutual. Insurance. Co. v. Peterson were not explicitly categorized 
as costs or damages, it should have been clear that they were damages because 
they were available based on a breach of a contractual duty to defend.  Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Crummins, supra note 12, at 488–89. 
 183. Id. at 507. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Compare Brief of Appellant at 15–17, T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr 
Const., LLC, 773 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn. 2009) (No. A08-1295), 2008 WL 
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respondent, Consolidated Lumber, argued that Minnesota case law 
has established that attorney’s fees in mechanic’s lien cases are 
considered “costs.”187  However, the appellant, Premier Bank, 
reasoned that attorney’s fees awarded under the mechanic’s lien 
statute are an element of the claimant’s damages because, 
according to the statute, the attorney’s fees become part of the lien 
amount when the property is sold to satisfy the lien judgment.188  
Considering the merger of the attorney’s fees into the lien 
judgment, it would not be unreasonable to consider them part of 
the damages that are linked to the underlying merits of the case. 
Perhaps the Minnesota Supreme Court should not be faulted 
for failing to develop clear criteria for an issue that is inherently 
complex.189  While particular judgments and orders are more 
clearly attached to the underlying merits of the case, commentators 
have noted that it is particularly difficult to determine whether 
attorney’s fee orders are tied to the merits.190  This is likely because, 
unlike many orders and judgments, those relating to attorney’s fees 
are often “only tangentially related to the merits” of the case.191 
3. The Need for Clarity in the Characterization of Attorney’s Fees: 
Potential Solutions 
After the ruling in T.A. Schifsky, it seems likely that, in some 
cases, doubt may remain as to whether or not a subsequent 
determination of attorney’s fees prevents the appeal period from 
beginning to run.  Untimely appeals could be prevented by 
encouraging litigants to appeal an initial judgment on the merits 
even if it seems that the attorney’s fee issue is tied to damages.  
 
7212058 (arguing that attorney’s fees must be considered damages under the 
mechanic’s lien statute because the statute mandates that fees awarded must be 
included in the lien amount and judgment), with Brief of Respondent at 12–13, 
T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Const., LLC, 773 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn. 2009) 
(No. A08-1295), 2009 WL 4548824 (arguing that the mechanic’s lien statute and 
prior case law has categorized attorney’s fees as collateral costs such that they do 
not affect the finality of the original judgment). 
 187. Brief of Respondent, supra note 186, at 12; see also Obraske v. Woody, 199 
N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn. 1972). 
 188. Brief of Appellant, supra note 186, at 16; see also MINN. STAT. § 514.14 
(2008) (“Judgment shall be given in favor of each lienholder for the amount 
demanded and proved, with costs and disbursements to be fixed by the court at 
the trial, and such amount shall not be included in the lien of any other party . . . 
.”). 
 189. See Annotation, supra note 69, at 271. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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However, this runs counter to the policy underlying the final 
judgment rule of preventing “fragmentary and premature appeals 
that unnecessarily delay the administration of justice” and 
encouraging one appeal per case.192 
A solution to the confusion in T.A. Schifsky may be the 
development of a bright-line rule in which attorney’s fees are 
characterized as collateral to the merits in all cases.  It is unlikely 
that the legal community would be greatly affected by such a rule 
because, as demonstrated by the previous discussion regarding 
efficiency, Minnesota courts primarily characterize attorney’s fees 
as collateral.  A unified collateral characterization would also 
prevent litigants from being forced to wait until attorney’s fee 
determinations are complete to collect a judgment or begin 
appealing substantive issues.  Moreover, as discussed in the 
previous section, a collateral characterization generally does not 
produce piecemeal appeals because Minnesota district court judges 
are resolving fee issues in time to consolidate the appeals.  Finally, a 
bright-line collateral rule would eliminate any confusion litigants 
face when trying to predict how attorney’s fees issues will be 
characterized in order to appeal in a timely manner.  Had a bright-
line rule been in place prior to T.A. Schifsky, Premier Bank may 
have appealed the original judgment in a timely manner without 
waiting for the pending attorney’s fee determination. 
An alternative solution may be the development of a 
procedural rule that forces district court judges to issue a sua sponte 
order characterizing attorney’s fees issues as either collateral or 
attached to the merits.  Particularly where attorney’s fees are 
available through a statute, district judges would have the ability to 
analyze the statutory language and determine whether or not the 
fees in question, if implicated, would be attached to the underlying 
merits of the case.193  In addition, such a rule must also provide the 
litigants with an opportunity to brief arguments relating to the 
 
 192. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 81 (2007). 
 193. Attorney’s fees may be available to a litigant because they are prescribed 
in a statute that is implicated in the case.  T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Const., 
LLC, 773 N.W.2d 783, 789 (Minn. 2009).  Attorney’s fees may also be available 
where the wrongful acts of the defendant have involved the plaintiff in litigation 
or have placed the plaintiff in a situation in which he or she is forced to incur 
expense for the protection of his or her rights or interests.  ROSSI, supra note 8, at 
§ 8:3.  However, because a determination of attorney’s fees based on a wrongful 
act will depend on facts that may arise during the trial, it would be more difficult 
for a judge to make a decision regarding the fees’ relationship to the merits prior 
to trial in that particular circumstance. 
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characterization of the attorney’s fees prior to the judge’s decision.  
The briefs could be submitted at a time that would permit the 
judge to render a decision at a Rule 16 pre-trial conference.194 
The utility of a sua sponte ruling is significantly diminished if 
the district court’s determination may be overturned on appeal.  
Therefore, in order for the rule to maintain its purpose of 
providing clarity to litigants, determinations made under it must be 
final and non-appealable.  While the non-appealable nature of such 
an order may significantly diverge from ordinary appellate practice, 
it would nevertheless ensure that litigants would possess the 
knowledge as to whether a subsequent attorney’s fee determination 
will affect the finality of a judgment.  This knowledge, in turn, will 
allow the litigant to accurately gauge the appeal period for a 
particular issue in order to avoid filing in an untimely manner.195 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of Minnesota courts’ approach to attorney’s fees 
has yielded mixed results.  As seen in federal courts, the collateral 
characterization of attorney’s fees opens the door to potential 
piecemeal appeals.  However, Minnesota courts have long 
combated this potential judicial inefficiency by following the advice 
originally outlined in Spaeth and renewed in T.A. Schifsky that 
attorney’s fees claims should be decided as soon as possible after 
the entry of judgment.  This expediency has, in turn, allowed 
appellate courts to reduce piecemeal appeals through the 
consolidation of attorney’s fees appeals and appeals on the merits. 
However, the court’s adoption of a case-by-case approach to 
the characterization of attorney’s fees in T.A. Schifsky is unlikely to 
provide litigants with the clarity to determine whether attorney’s 
fees are considered collateral to the merits or attached to the 
 
 194. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 16.01 (“In any action, the court may in its discretion 
direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before 
it for a conference or conferences before trial.”). 
 195. It is worth noting that such a preliminary determination regarding the 
nature of the attorney’s fees in T.A. Schifsky may have prevented Premier Bank’s 
untimely appeal.  Had the trial court judge made an irreversible preliminary 
ruling that the attorney’s fees were costs that were collateral to the merits of the 
case, Premier Bank would have likely been alerted to the fact that the attorney’s 
fee claim would not be considered a separate claim on its own merits under 
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02.  Therefore, in such a case, Premier Bank 
may have appealed at an earlier time under the presumption that the initial 
judgment was final and appealable. 
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merits.  As demonstrated in T.A. Schifksy, when the nature of the 
attorney’s fees is unclear, litigants may be prone to filing an 
untimely appeal.  Minnesota courts would be wise to consider 
solutions that would eliminate the case-by-case approach to 
attorney’s fees in favor of a mechanism that favors clarity and 
certainty in characterizing attorney’s fees.  Regardless of the 
approach, the advice given by Michael Green over twenty-five years 
ago still rings true today: “providing clear and certain rules to 
govern the multifaceted procedural problems raised by the 




 196. Green, supra note 12, at 301. 
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